This article studies the characteristics of a S-based tax system under default risk. In particular we show that its neutrality properties depend on whether debt is protected or unprotected. In the former case, this system is neutral. In the latter case, where default timing is optimally chosen by shareholders, the S-based system is neutral with respect to real decisions only if the …rm's and the lender's tax rate are equal. However, the shareholders' decision to default is always distorted.
Introduction
One of the basic neutral tax designs is the 'imputed income method' (see Boadway and Bruce, 1984) . Over the last decade this method has become popular in Europe. At the beginning of the '90s, the Nordic countries introduced Dual Income Tax (DIT) which allows a lower tax rate on capital income. In the same period, the IFS Capital Taxes Group (1991) proposed the Allowance for Corporate Equity (ACE) and subsequently other countries, such as Austria, Croatia and Italy, applied dual tax systems. 1 More recently, the Skauge Committee has proposed in Norway a tax system which shares some important features with the ACE tax system. 2 The imputed income system allows two alternative treatments of the cost of debt. On the one hand, debt is deductible at the risk-free rate: this system will be named R-based. On the other hand, debt is deductible at the interest rate actually paid: we will call it the S-based system 3 . This option, which is quite common in existing tax systems, is supported by Keen and King (2002) . They stress the fact that the computation of the tax base is easy as it is based on book values. Moreover they argue that the deduction of actual interest expenses does not distort …rms' choices as long as debt is competitively supplied. In this case all rents accrue to shareholders, and taxation is neutral. This point is proven by Bond and Devereux (2003) (hereafter BD), who show that an S-based system is neutral under default risk even if the …rm's and the lender's tax rate are di¤erent 4 . However, BD point out that their result holds on condition that capital markets are perfectly e¢ cient and information is symmetric. If, instead, capital markets are imperfect and in particular information is asymmetric, borrowers and lenders might collude in order to avoid taxation. In this case, the government would require a greater amount of information to …ght tax avoidance.
In this article we aim to show that the neutrality properties of the S-based system are less general than thought, and that distortions may arise even under perfect credit market e¢ ciency and symmetric information. To show this we will depart from BD, who treat default as an exogenous event, and introduce two well-known default conditions. The …rst one refers to protected debt. In this case default may be triggered when the …rms'asset value falls to the debt's value. This means that debt is approximated with a positive net-covenant. 5 The second default condition regards unprotected debt, and implies that default timing is optimally chosen by shareholders. When the …rm's net cash ‡ow is negative, shareholders may have the opportunity to inject further equity capital in order to meet the …rm's debt obligations. As long as they issue new capital and pay the interest rate they can exploit future recoveries in the …rm's pro…tability. In this case, shareholders behave as if they owned a put option, whose exercise leads to default. 6 It will be shown that neutrality holds only under fully protected debt …nancing. If, instead, debt is unprotected, a twofold distortion may arise. Firstly, investment may be distorted unless a uniform tax rate is levied on both shareholders and the lender. Secondly, taxation always a¤ects shareholders'decision to default.
The article is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces a continuoustime model and analyzes both protected and unprotected debt. Section 3 describes the e¤ects of S-based taxation on the …rm's value. Section 4 derives the neutrality results under protected and unprotected debt …nancing. Section 5 summarizes the results and discusses their policy implications.
The model
In line with Leland (1994) we apply a continuous-time model describing the investment decision made by a representative …rm. At time 0; the …rm decides whether to undertake an in…nitely-lived project, whose cost is I: investment is thus undertaken if the project Net Present Value is positive. 5 For further details see Brennan and Schwartz (1978) , and Smith and Wardner (1977) . 6 As pointed out by Leland (1994) both protected and unprotected debt are widely used. In particular, minimum net-worth requirements, implied by protected debt, are common in short-term debt …nancing, whereas long-term debt instruments are usually unprotected or only partially protected. 7 For simplicity, we assume that the …rm cannot postpone its investment decision.
The …rm's EBIT at time t, de…ned as t ; is subject to a shock and, in particular, follows a geometric Brownian motion
where is the instantaneous standard deviation of
The assumptions on the …rm's capital structure are the following:
1. the risk-free interest rate r is …xed;
2. credit markets are perfectly competitive;
3. information is symmetric;
4. at time 0, the …rm borrows some resources and pays a constant coupon C 0 , which cannot be renegotiated.
The …rst three assumptions describe a perfectly e¢ cient setting. Assumption 4 deserves some comment. It is worth noting that setting C and then computing the market value of debt is equivalent to set …rst, the value of debt and then, compute the equilibrium interest rate. 9 Assumption 4 also means that debt maturity is in line with the investment lifetime. 10 Default occurs when the …rm does not meet its debt obligation. In this case it is expropriated by the lender. Let us next introduce the two default conditions. De…nition 1 Under protected debt …nancing, default takes place when t falls to an exogenously given threshold point e p .
As will be shown, full debt protection is ensured if the threshold point e p is equal to C: 8 With no loss of generality, we assume that the drift of the Brownian motion is nil. 9 Notice that the introduction of any trade-o¤ is beyond the scope of this article. In the absence of any distress cost, therefore, C is not the result of an optimal choice but rather is exogenously given. 10 This assumption is realistic. As shown for instance by Graham and Harvey (2001) more than 63% of the US …rms surveyed state that debt maturity is aimed at matching with assets'lifetime. On the other hand, BD assume a one-period debt …nancing strategy for a two-period investment project. However, they argue that the quality of results does not change if a new debt issue in the following period is assumed (see Bond and Devereux, 1999) .
De…nition 2 Under unprotected debt …nancing, the threshold point e u is chosen optimally by shareholders at time 0.
In both cases, the existence of symmetric information means that, at time 0, the creditor knows e i with i = p; u before lending.
The tax system
Let us next introduce the S-based system, which allows the deduction of both e¤ective interest payments and the opportunity cost of equity …nance. Under full loss-o¤set 11 , the tax base will be n t C r h I D i e i ; 0 ; C io for i = p; u and t 0:
As can be seen the relief on equity …nance is equal to the default-free interest rate times the book value of equity 12 ,
; that is the difference between the historical cost of the investment project and the initial value of debt. 13 Contrary to cash- ‡ow systems, tax bene…ts are distributed along the investment's lifetime. This implies that, in the event of default, shareholders would fail to obtain a full tax bene…t, unless an ad hoc rebate were granted. For this reason, BD propose a rebate equal to
which is computed when default takes place. As shown in (2) the rebate is equal to the tax rate multiplied by the di¤erence between the book value of the asset, i.e. I, and the net present value of the subsequent pre-tax cash ‡ow in the event of default, i.e.
. This means that, under symmetric information, the government observes e i and then sets the rebate, thereby ensuring full compensation.
The value of debt
Like the …rm, the lender is subject to S-based tax, though its tax rate may di¤er from the …rm's one.
Before default, the lender' base is given by the di¤erence between the interest payment (i.e. the coupon) and the opportunity cost of debt, i.e. rD i e i ; 0 ; C . In line with BD, we assume that when default occurs, the tax relief is proportional to the net present value of the subsequent pre-tax cash ‡ows of the project. In this case, the opportunity cost of debt will be r times the market value of debt when = e i ; i.e. D i e i ; e i ; C . Given the tax rate h the lender's after-tax cash ‡ow will then be 8 <
:
Under market e¢ ciency, the value of debt at time 0 is such that the following non-arbitrage condition (see Appendix A)
holds. Equation (3) entails the equality between a risk-free asset whose return is r and a risky asset (the lender's credit) whose return is the e¤ective interest rate, net of the default risk premium. As can be seen, taxation may be distortive since any change in the rate h must be o¤set by a change in the value of debt in order for condition (3) to hold. Solving (3) we can write the value of debt at time 0 (see Appendix A) as a weighted average between the cash ‡ow received before default and that received after:
The weight is c e i ; 0
; where b e i ; 0 0 e i 2 ; and 2 < 0 is the negative root of the characteristic equation
The term c e i ; 0 measures the present value of 1 Euro contingent on the event default. As can be seen, it di¤ers from the discount factor b e i ; 0 . This is due to the fact that an increase in the rate h raises the aftertax risk premium and, consequently, c e i ; 0 . Therefore the inequality b e i ; 0 < c e i ; 0 holds. Let us next analyze the impact of the default conditions on the value of debt. By de…nition, full protection implies that the value of debt is equal to that of a default risk-free asset. Using (4) we can thus obtain
Equality (6) implies that full protection holds if e p = C. It is thus clear that taxation does not a¤ect the value of debt. This is the case implicitly analyzed by BD. When debt is unprotected, the trigger point e u is not necessarily equal to C: In this case, default entails that the lender's expected cash ‡ow changes from C to e u : Using (4) we obtain the e¤ective interest rate as the sum of the risk-free interest rate and the default risk premium:
The value of equity
To compute the value of equity we must introduce a boundary condition regarding default. We know that at point = e i shareholders are expropriated, and, therefore, their claim is just equal to the tax rebate. De…ning E i e i ; t ; C as the value of equity therefore, we can write the following Value Matching Condition 14 E i e i ; e i ; C = R i e i for i = p; u:
Applying condition (8) (see Appendix B) we can compute the value of equity
is the net-of-tax cash ‡ow. As shown in (9), the value of equity consists of two terms. The …rst term,
; is a perpetual rent proportional to aftertax cash ‡ow. The second term measures the overall e¤ect of default. This component is equal to the product between the discount factor b e i ; t and the shareholders'net tax rebate R i e i Y i ( e i ; e i ;C) r ; i.e. the tax rebate received in the event of default minus future cash ‡ow lost by expropriation.
As can be seen, the shareholders' discount factor is b e i ; t ; and thus di¤ers from the lender's one. 15 
Neutrality results
Let us next analyze the neutrality properties of the S-based tax system. Here we deal with both real and …nancial neutrality, when the …rm's decisions are made at time t = 0: To de…ne real neutrality let us write the …rm's Net Present Value
Following Brown (1948) we can thus state that
Condition 1 Real neutrality holds if
where N P V ( 0 ) 0 r I is the Net Present Value in the absence of taxation.
As pointed out by Johansson (1969, p.104), equation (11) entails that an 'identical ranking of alternative investments is obtained in a pre-tax and post-tax pro…tability analysis'. Moreover, condition (11) implies that the Modigliani-Miller Theorem holds.
Substituting (4) and (9) into (10) yields
where
io measures the overall tax distortion. This distortion consists of two terms. The …rst one measures the present value of the after-tax risk premium before default. The second term is given by the expected devaluation of debt conditional on the event of debt. If therefore X e i ; 0 ; C = 0; real neutrality is ensured. The second neutrality condition regards unprotected debt. In this case, indeed, shareholders can decide when to default. De…ning e u LF as the default trigger point in the absence of taxation, we can thus state that Condition 2 Financial neutrality holds if default timing is not a¤ected by taxation, i.e. e u = e u LF .
Protected debt
Let us start with protected debt …nancing. We can write the following Proposition 1 If debt is fully protected the S-based system is neutral.
Proof. See Appendix C. As pointed out in Section 3.1 full protection is ensured if e p = C: This implies that D p e p ; 0 ; C = D p (C; 0 ; C) : Moreover, the lender's postdefault claim is equal to D i e i ; e i ; C = e i r ; i = u; p (see Appendix C):
Therefore the shareholders'rebate is equal to R p (C) = I C r : this makes X e p ; 0 ; C fall to zero. The intuition behind this result is straightforward:
the cash ‡ow tax and equivalently, any imputed income tax systems can be thought of as ensuring relief for both the risk-free rate and the risk premium (see Devereux, 2003) . As shown in (6), however, the default risk premium falls to zero and any distortive e¤ect of h on the value of debt vanishes.
Unprotected debt
Proposition 1 is in line with BD's …ndings. When debt is unprotected, however, results are quite di¤erent. In this case, the default trigger point e u is optimally chosen by maximizing the value of equity, i.e.
Solving (13) we obtain Proposition 2 Under unprotected debt …nancing the inequalities e u < e u LF < C hold 8 .
Proof. See Appendix D. Proposition 2 shows that shareholders postpone their default decision. To get the intuition behind the result it is worth noting that e u LF < C; namely that, without taxation, the default option is exercised when the net cash ‡ow is negative. This is due to the fact that default is an irreversible choice 16 : shareholders are aware that the exercise of the put option entails the irreversible loss of any opportunity to exploit future pro…t recoveries. Under the S-based system, the lower the point e u is, the greater is the value of the rebate received by shareholders. Not surprisingly therefore we have e u < e u LF ; i.e. default timing is delayed. 17 Let us next focus on real e¤ects. We can prove the following:
Proposition 3 Under unprotected debt …nancing a real distortion arises if h 6 = , i.e.
16 Remember that the default trigger point e u is set at time 0 and is known by the lender. 17 Notice that this behaviour is stimulated by full loss-o¤set provisions. In this case, loss-making …rms enjoy a tax bene…t and may be induced to further postpone default.
Proof. See Appendix E. The intuition behind Proposition 3 is as follows. Assume that initially the equality = h holds. Then suppose that h is cut. This tax rate change has a twofold e¤ect. On the one hand, it reduces the value of debt D u e u ; 0 ; C , and, on the other hand, raises the shareholders tax bene…t r h I D u e u ; 0 ; C i ; thereby increasing the value of equity. Proposition 3 thus shows that the decrease in D u e u ; 0 ; C is overcompensated by the increase in E u e u ; 0 ; C ; so inequality N P V u e u ; 0 ; C >
(1 ) N P V ( 0 ) holds and we have overinvestment. 18 The converse is true if h is raised.
The above result is not surprising if we disregard the …rm's ownership and rather, focus on the project value. We can in fact state that inequality > h is equivalent to an expected tax rate cut occurring whenever falls to e u : This expected tax cut thus stimulates investment. 19 The converse is true if < h:
Concluding remarks and policy implications
In this article we have shown that the neutrality properties of an S-based system depend on the default condition assumed. In particular, we have shown that both real and …nancial neutrality hold when debt is protected.
When debt is unprotected, results are di¤erent. Real neutrality is ensured only under uniform taxation. Moreover, …nancial neutrality never holds, as shareholders are induced to delay their default decision.
In a companion article we showed that an R-based system, allowing for deduction of debt at the risk-free rate, ensures both real and …nancial neutrality irrespective of whether debt is protected or unprotected. This allows us to conclude that in terms of neutrality, a R-based system is preferable to a S-based one even in perfectly e¢ cient capital markets.
A The computation of (3) and (4) Using dynamic programming, the value of debt can be written as follows
otherwise. (15) where [:] is the expectation operator.
Let us …rst focus on the pre-default value of debt. Expanding the RHS of (15) and applying Itô's Lemma, one obtains
Recalling that (dt) 2 ! 0 one easily obtains the following non-arbitrage condition
(17) Manipulating (17) one easily obtains (3).
Let us next solve (17) . Thus before default we obtain
where 1 and 2 are the positive and negative root of the characteristic equation (5), respectively. After default the value of debt is
We can now compute the values of G i j and L i j for j = 1; 2: To do so we must introduce two boundary conditions, which are in line with the assumption of perfectly e¢ cient capital markets. 20 Firstly, we assume that no …nancial bubbles exist. This means that G (19) we thus have
To compute G i 2 ; let the two branches (18) and (19) meet at point t = e i : Using (20) we thus have
Using (18) and setting = 0 yields the value of debt at time 0
Substituting ( 
Rearranging yields (4).
B The computation of (9)
The …rm's value of equity can be written as 20 For further details on this boundary conditions see e.g. Dixit and Pindyck (1994) .
As shown in (24) , in the event of default, shareholders are expropriated and the value of their claim is simply equal to R i e i :
Let us next focus on the pre-default case. Expanding the RHS of (24), one obtains the following Bellman equation
Solving (25) yields
Let us next compute F 
Substituting (27) into (26), at point 0 yields (9).
C Proof of Proposition 1
Substituting (6) into (4), we easily obtain the equality e p = C. This means that
Moreover using (20) we obtains the following inequalities
Substituting (28) and (29) into (10) yields (11) . This proves Proposition 1.
D Proof of Proposition 2
Recall (9) and (27) , and rewrite the value of equity as
Compute now the …rst order condition of problem (13) . It is clear that (31) To analyze the distortive e¤ect of taxation, recall (30), and set = h = 0:
We thus obtain the laissez-faire threshold point:
By contradiction we can now prove that e u < e u LF : Assume ab absurdo that e u > C: In this case equation (31) holds, but it is straightforward to see that H e u ; 0 ; C < 0. This entails that no solution e u > C ensures a maximum. Moreover, assume ab absurdo that C < e u < C: In this case (31) does not hold: thus no solution can be found. Therefore, the solution must be such that inequality e u < 
E Proof of Proposition 3
Using (4) we can rewrite (12) as N P V u e u ; 0 ; C = (1 ) N P V ( 0 ) + X e u ; 0 ; C
where X e u ; 0 ; C n Since e u < C; we can write (14) , thereby proving Proposition 3.
